The Proposed Michigan Business Corporation Act by Siegel, Stanley
University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform 
Volume 4
1970 
The Proposed Michigan Business Corporation Act 
Stanley Siegel 
University of Michigan Law School 
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mjlr 
 Part of the Business Organizations Law Commons, Legislation Commons, and the State and Local 
Government Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Stanley Siegel, The Proposed Michigan Business Corporation Act, 4 U. MICH. J. L. REFORM 161 (1970). 
Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mjlr/vol4/iss2/2 
 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform at 
University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in University of 
Michigan Journal of Law Reform by an authorized editor of University of Michigan Law School Scholarship 
Repository. For more information, please contact mlaw.repository@umich.edu. 
UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN
Journal of Law Reform





When passed forty years ago, Michigan's General Corporation
Act1 was a forward-looking act, pioneering in several respects. 2 In
the ensuing years, as use of the corporate form increased, at-
tempts to mold its structure to the needs of particular enterprises
produced substantial litigation and statutory developments in
many states? Some of these developments led to amendments to
the Michigan Act,4 but many did not. The result is that in 1971,
Michigan's General Corporation Act is a confused, heavily
amended and archaic statute that is now largely unsuited to the
needs of Michigan corporations. Several major Michigan corpo-
rations have recently reincorporated in other states -primarily
Delaware-with the avowed purpose of avoiding the confusing
and restrictive provisions of the Michigan Act.5
Early in 1968, at the request of the Private Corporations Com-
mittee of the House and the Senate Corporations Committee, the
Michigan Law Revision Commission began the drafting of a new
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Michigan Law School. B.S., 1960, New
York University; LL.B., 1963, Harvard.
'Act 327, effective Sept. 18, 1931; MICH. COMP. LAWS §§450.1 - .192 (1967), as
amended, (Supp. 1970).
2 In that day, years before "close corporations" became a major concern of lawyers and
.statute draftsmen, Michigan had already eliminated the requirement of three incorporators
(MICH. CoMP. LAWS § 450.3 (1967)), had specifically permitted high quorum and vote
requirement in the articles of incorporation (MICH. COMP. LAWS § 450.32 (1967)), and had
made provision for voting trusts (MICH. COMp. LAWS § 450.34 (1967)).
3 Nearly every close-corporation control device came under judicial scrutiny. See, e.g.,
Benintendi v. Kenton Hotel, 294 N.Y. 112, 60 N.E.2d 829 (1945) (unanimous vote
requirements); Ringling Bros.-Barnum & Bailey Combined Shows v. Ringling, 29 Del. Ch.
610, 53 A.2d 441 (Sup. Ct. 1947) (voting pools); Abercrombie v. Davies, 36 Del. Ch. 371,
130 A.2d 338 (Sup. Ct. 1957) (control agreements); Clark v. Dodge, 269 N.Y. 410, 199
N.E. 641 (1936) (agreements limiting director discretion). One of the earliest decisions
upholding a broad control agreement in the absence of special statutory provision was
Galler v. Galler, 32 lll.2d 16, 203 N.E-2d 577 (1964). The court in that decision speci-
fically took note of the particular characteristics of close corporations that simultaneously
make such agreements both necessary and not violative of public policy. Subsequent
statutory revision in many states clarified and expanded upon the Galler development; see
text accompanying notes 23-34 infra.
4 See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 450.52 (Supp. 1970) as amended by [1969]
Public Act No. 4 (the so-called "J.L. Hudson amendment," broadening the permissible
consideration in a merger).
5 E.g., Hoover Ball & Bearing Company (to Delaware in 1968), Clark Equipment
Company (to Delaware in 1968)..
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Business Corporation Act.6 The efforts of the Commission were
limited to the sections of the General Corporation Act related to
business corporations.
7
The author of this article was selected by the Commission as
Reporter, to draft and revise the statute. It is the purpose of this
article to describe the drafting process, to outline the general
structure and to examine some unique aspects of the proposed
Michigan Business Corporation Act. In this discussion, the author
expresses his own views only, and does not necessarily reflect the
opinions of the Law Revision Commission or its members.
II. THE PROCESS. OF DRAFTING
Within the last fifteen years, the corporation laws of virtually all
of the major commercial states- and indeed, a majority of all the
states-have been rewritten. Among the more important com-
mercial states to completely rewrite or substantially revise their
corporation acts are New York,8 New Jersey9 and Delaware.10
Moreover, a number of states of relatively lesser commercial
importance have recently enacted new and unusual corporation
provisions." Much of the impetus for this effort has come-in
addition to business need-from the Model Business Corporation
Act, which itself has been revised recently.1 2 Although the tally is
confused by departure from the language of the Model Act, some
twenty states now have corporation codes substantially in con-
formity with the Model Act.13
In nearly every case, the thrust of revision efforts has been to
"liberalize" the corporation statute: to make it permissive and to
6 Letter of Feb. 22, 1968, citing unanimous resolution of House Committee; letter of
March 28, 1968, citing unanimous vote on March 13 of Senate Committee. The Law
Revision Commission, an organ of the State Legislature, has the following members: Jason
L. Honigman (Chairman); Tom Downs (Vice Chairman); David Lebenbom; Harold Saw-
yer. Ex Officio are Senators Robert L. Richardson and Basil W. Brown; and Representa-
tives J. Robert Traxler and Donald E. Holbrook, Jr.; and Allan E. Reyhons, Director of
the Legislative Service Bureau. Professor Carl Hawkins of the University of Michigan
Law School is Executive Secretary of the Commission.
7 Non-business corporations are also derivatively affected by the proposals, and, at
some later date, sections dealing with non-profit corporations will similarly need revision.
8 N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW (McKinney 1963).
9
N.J. STAT. ANN. tit. 14A (1969).
10 
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8 (1967).
"E.g., Florida's close corporation law. FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 608.70 - 608.77 (1963);
Maryland's close corporation law, MD. ANN. CODE art. 23, §§ 100- 111 (Supp. 1970);
South Carolina's new "freeze-out" provisions. S.C. CODE ANN. § 12-22.15(a)(4).
12-23.23 (Supp. 1970); Connecticut's simplified filing procedures, CONN. GEN. STAT.
ANN. § 33-285 (Supp. 1970).
12 ALI-ABA, MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT (1969 Rev.) (hereinafter MBCA).
13 See Preface to 1969 Revision, MBCA.
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avoid as many restrictive rules as state policy will allow.1 4 Indeed,
in a kind of perverse development of the "state laboratories"
notion of federalism, the states began in the early part of this
century to vie with each other for corporate domiciliaries by
progressively eliminating all state control over corporations.' 5
This competition is not over, as demonstrated by the Report of
the Corporation Law Revision Commission of New Jersey:' 6
The modem corporation's business is frequently national
or international in scope; its state of incorporation is largely
incidental. Recognizing this fact, and seeking to attract corpo-
rations to establish their domiciles within their borders, most
states in recent decades have been increasingly flexible and
permissive in revising their corporation laws.
Pursuing this policy perhaps further than any other state,
the Commission believes it is following sound public policy
for New Jersey. It is clear the the major protections to in-
vestors, creditors, employees, customers, and the general
public have come, and must continue to come, from Federal
legislation and not from state corporation acts.... Any at-
tempts to provide such regulations in the public interest
through state incorporation acts and similar legislation would
only drive corporations out of the state to more hospitable
jurisdictions.
One can hardly take issue with this statement today. Protections
formerly afforded by state law are now provided generally by
more effective federal legislation.' 7 Restrictive state statutes do
cause an exodus of corporations, as Michigan's recent experience
amply demonstrates. It is at least arguable, however, that the
cumulative effect of state "liberalization" has been to cause an
undesirable but necessary increase in federal scrutiny of internal
affairs of corporations. In addition, there may be questions as to
whether particular forms of "liberalization" do not overly favor
corporate autonomy at the expense of legitimate interests that
need protection. If either of these points be valid, one may decry
the recent trend to liberalization. But few states, barring unusual
circumstances' 8 may with impunity-and success-buck the
trend.
So it is that Michigan now revises its Business Corporation
14 A conspicuous exception to this trend is California, which, unlike most other states,
rigidly enforces its restrictive statute. It has proved successful in its efforts, as well. See
Western Airlines v. Sobieski, 12 Cal. Rptr. 719 (196 1).
'1 See W. CARY, CORPORATIONS 9-15 (4th ed. 1969).
16 June 20, 1968.
17 In particular, the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.
'8 E.g., California, supra note 14.
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Act, and does so, for the most part, in the most liberal tradition of
corporation law revision. The revision has been considerably
more complex than those in states adopting, with little or no
change, the Model Business Corporation Act. The strongest argu-
ment for the Model Act is its wide adoption, and for this reason,
much of the Model Act language is included in the proposed
revision. However, even as revised in 1969, the Model Act is
neither complete nor current in a number of critical areas,' 9 and
the Model Act's organization is not as effective as several more
recent enactments.
The states that have embarked on revisions beyond the Model
Act format have spent considerable time and money in the pro-
cess. The New York Business Corporation Law was enacted in
1961 after five years of study costing several million dollars. New
Jersey's commission reported its conclusions after a decade of
work and 176 formal meetings. 20 Delaware's statute, which is not
a new law, but rather an extensive revision with additions, took
four years of effort by the Corporation Revision Commission.
With these revisions completed, the Michigan Law Revision
Commission was able, within the relatively short period of two
and a half years, and at relatively small expense, to prepare a
statute reflecting studies from several perspectives. Indeed, a fair
number of sections are adopted verbatim-or with only minor
changes-from recently revised statutes, with the virtues of a
degree of interstate uniformity and the ability to use desirable
court interpretations of specific language. Despite this, the pro-
posed Act has its own distinct philosophy, reflected in the dis-
cussion below.
The actual process of revision consisted of the preparation by
the Reporter of initial drafts of each chapter of the proposed Act.
These were reviewed in detail with the Commission Chairman
and examined by the Commission members. 2' The resulting sub-
stantially revised fully annotated drafts were distributed, in two
installments, to all concerned members of the Bar and the State
Government. Extensive comments were received, 22 and again the
drafts were revised, following joint meetings with the Bar, the
Commission, the Reporter, and interested state officials. The
--- '9 One of the most important areas in which the Model Act has failed to reflect a more
innovative trend deals with close corporations.
2
0 REPORT OF THE CORPORATION LAW REVISION COMMISSION OF NEW JERSEY (June
20, 1968).
21 Mr. Cyril Moscow, of the Detroit Bar, helped the Commission greatly in the detailed
review process.
2 The comments were received primarily from the Michigan State Bar Association
Subcommittee chaired by Melbourne Miller of the Detroit Bar.
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Revised and Annotated Michigan Business Corporation Act was
submitted as part of the Law Revision Commission's 1970 report
to the Legislature.
III. AN OUTLINE OF THE ACT
A. Close Corporations
The Act is organized chronologically, similarly to the New
York and New Jersey acts. It consists of eleven chapters and a
repealer. 23 Early in the revision effort, the draftsmen were
presented with an organizational question with substantive over-
tones: whether to draft a separate act or chapter containing provi-
sions applicable to close corporations. That special provisions
were necessary for close corporations was obvious: it was one of
the motivating reasons for the revision. The separate law or
chapter approach has been followed in Florida,2 4 Delaware2 5 and
Maryland.2 6 By contrast, three-quarters of the remaining jurisdic-
tions have special provisions for close corporations, but no sepa-
rate statute.
A major problem of close corporation legislation is the defini-
tional consideration of which corporations shall be permitted to
make use of the special code sections. The problem becomes
particularly perplexing if the draftsman attempts to apply the
same standard of applicability to all of the special sections, as
must be the case if close corporations are the subject of a separate
law or subchapter. Thus, Florida defines a close corporation as "a
corporation for profit whose shares of stock are not generally
traded in the markets maintained by securities dealers or bro-
kers,"27 and permits any such corporation to elect treatment un-
der the special provisions. However, it is not altogether clear that
all of the special provisions should turn on this one criterion;
23 Ch. 1. Title, Definitions and Miscellaneous Procedural Provisions.
Ch. 2. Formation of Corporations, Corporate Name, and Service of Process.
Ch. 3. Corporate Purposes and Powers.
Ch. 4. Capital Structure and Corporate Finance.
Ch. 5. Shareholders.
Ch. 6. Directors and Officers.
Ch. 7. Amendments.
Ch. 8. Corporate Combinations and Dispositions.
Ch. 9. Dissolution.
Ch.10. Reports.
Ch.I 1. Foreign Corporations.
Ch.12. Repealer.
4 FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 608.70 - .77 (1963).
2 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 341 - 56 (Supp. 1968).
26 MD. ANN. CODE art. 23, §§ 100 - I I (Supp. 1970).
27 FLA. STAT. ANN. § b08.70(2) (1963)
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provisions for dissolution or provisional directors in the event of
deadlock, for example, might have value for publicly-traded cor-
porations. By contrast, New York applies the publicly-traded test
only to determine the validity of restrictive shareholder agree-
ments. 2
8
A second approach to defining close corporation status is
presented in the recent revisions of the Maryland and Delaware
corporation codes, both of which include separate subchapters for
close corporations. Under these statutes close corporation status
is achieved by election plus qualification, which includes a numer-
ical and a public-traded standard.2 9 Action that might cause dis-
qualification as a close-corporation, rather than automatically
voiding such status, triggers a remedy on the part of shareholders
to void the action.30 Although this approach avoids the major
objection to the Florida statute-that a single transaction con-
stituting public trading (an ill-defined concept) would void agree-
ments and understandings and alter completely the relationships
of the shareholders-it does not avoid the more important objec-
tion to separate close corporation legislation: that it attempts,
generally unsuccessfully, to apply the same standard for appli-
cation to diverse code sections of inherently varying appli-
cability.
Accordingly, a section by section approach to close corpo-
rations, similar to New York's, was followed in the revision. No
code provision defines close corporations. Instead, to fall within a
particular provision, the Corporation must meet its specific re-
quirements. For example, simple voting agreements are valid
without any limitations,31 whereas agreements restricting the dis-
cretion of directors must be unanimous, and become invalid if
shares are publicly traded.32 By contrast, a provision for dis-
solution at the option of a stated percentage of shareholders or on
the happening of a specified event may be written into the articles
of incorporation by simple majority vote. 33
28 N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 620(c) (McKinney Supp. 1970).
An early commentator proposed a test based on number of shareholders (no more
than 10) and lack of public trading. Winer, Proposing a New York "Close Corporation"
Law, 28 CORN. L.Q. 313, 315 (1943). At least one recent commentator supports such a
quantitative standard to provide definitional clarity and uniformity. Bradley, Toward a
More Perfect Close Corporation: The Need for More and Improved Legislation, 54 GEo.
L.J. 1145, 1190 (1966).
3 0 E.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 348(b) (Supp. 1968) vests the Court of Chancery with
jurisdiction to enjoin any action which would threaten close corporation status, on the
complaint of any shareholder. Maryland has similar provisions.
31 Proposed Mich. Bus. Corp. Act § 514(a).
32 Id. § 5 14(b) - (c).
33 Id. § 90§4. Other sections with specific requirements are: § 415(c), corporation may
provide shares redeemable at option of shareholder (by provision in articles, by unanimous
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The philosophy of the Act is broadly permissive, in accord with
other recent revisions. Throughout, strictures on operations and
structure that do not protect any legitimate and necessarily pro-
tected interest are eliminated. Often, in their place are substituted
less onerous but more meaningful protections. In several in-
stances, where a general practice has emerged,3 4 its validity has
been specifically recognized.
B. Filing and Organizational Formalities
In the interests of manageable length, comments here will be
limited to those parts of the proposed Act that represent new or
unusual developments. The proposed Act includes probably the
,most simple and uniform filing and documentation procedures in
the nation. All required filings fall within the provisions of section
106: a single copy of the document, signed by one corporate
official, and without seal or attestation, together with the required
fees, is filed with the Administrator.35 The Administrator returns
a true copy showing the filing date. The document becomes
effective at the time of filing, unless a subsequent effective date
(up to ninety days after filing) is specified therein. This procedure
is derived from provisions of the new Connecticut 3 6 and New
Jersey3 7 acts.
Organizational formalities are also greatly simplified. Section
202 permits use of the "all purposes" clause in the articles of
incorporation, avoiding the need for lengthy, inclusive statements
of purposes in the articles. This type of provision-which also
allows a corporation specifically to exclude certain purposes if it
so desires-is gaining increasing acceptance.38 In common with
other recent statutes, and indeed with the earlier General Corpo-
ration Act,3 9 section 201 of the proposed Act allows in-
corporation by one person. The incorporators may designate the
vote); § 503, action by shareholders without meeting and without prior notice (by what-
ever majority needed to carry the action by the usual vote); § 513, greater than majority
voting provisions (by provision in the articles, added by the stated majority vote, e.g., 80%
voting requirement must be introduced by 80% vote); § 515, voting trusts (by simple
agreement); § 516, share transfer restrictions (on original issuance restrictions are valid
against all; after original issuance restrictions are valid against those who consent); § 912,
court power to dissolve for deadlock; and § 913, court discretion to dissolve or take other
action against oppression by majority (apply by statute to all corporations).
34 E.g., sale of assets merger.
35 Under the Act, administration is transferred back to the Department of Commerce.
Proposed Mich. Bus. Corp. Act § 102(a).
36 CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 33-285 (Supp. 1970).
37 N.J. REV. STAT. § 14A: I - 6 (1969).
38
See Wisc. STAT. § 180.45 (1967); N.J. REV. STAT. § 14A: 2 - 7 (1969). DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 8, § 102(a)(3) (Supp. 1968).
39 MICH. COMP. LAWS § 450.3 (1967).
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initial board of directors either before or after the filing of the
articles, under a procedure similar to-but more flexible
than - Delaware's.
40
C. Capital Structure and Dividends
Capital structure and dividend treatment are also simplified,
yielding a more rational statute. Early cases and commentators
assumed that the capital of a corporation constitutes a "trust
fund" for the protection of creditors, and that 'the establishment
and maintenance intact of this fund was the quid pro quo for the
law's grant of limited liability to the owners of the enterprise. 41
This notion may have had validity as recently as the early years of
this century, but it is surely of dubious merit today. Though the
capital of a corporation may be a last resort of creditors, it is only
in the event of insolvency (inability to pay debts as they come
due) that this protection assumes importance. The protection of
creditors is primarily in the corporation's earnings, which provide
the ability to pay debt service.42 A statute that attempts, as many
do, to provide further asset protection to creditors than a prohibi-
tion of corporate activity which would render the corporation
insolvent flies in the face of practice and unnecessarily limits
corporate action. Moreover, statutes such as the Model Act 4a
which attempt to provide protection by limiting dividends to
earned surplus usually leave open other outlets by which divi-
dends may be paid up to the point of insolvency. 44 The Reporter
and the Commission were strongly of the view that no genuine
protection of creditors was inherent in such a statutory structure,
and that it was preferable to treat corporations as other debtors,
allowing them to make distributions provided such distributions
did not create or threaten insolvency. The same philosophy un-
derlies the Act's provisions on capital structure.
The Act provides that dividends may generally be paid out of
any surplus, provided the corporation is not insolvent or would
not thereby be rendered insolvent. 45 This structure is derived
40 Proposed Mich. Bus. Corp. Act § 204. Compare DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 107 (Supp.
1968), which provides that the naming may precede the filing, but which requires then that
the first board be named in the articles.
41 See, e.g., Scovill v. Thayer, 105 U.S. 143 (1881) (a watered stock case).
4 See H. GUTHMANN & H. DOUGALL, CORPORATE FINANCIAL POLICY 436-440 (3d ed.
1955).
43 MBCA § 45.
4 E.g., MBCA § 46 (capital surplus dividends by vote of shareholders); MBCA § 69
(reduction of capital by vote of shareholders).
4 Proposed Mich. Bus. Corp. Act. § 413.
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from the New York46 and Delaware47 statutes, except that the
"wasting asset" provisions of these statutes, as well as Dela-
ware's "nimble dividend" provisions, have been deleted. The
"wasting asset" exception, widely enacted, is designed to allow
corporations in the extractive industries to make distributions in
excess of surplus to the extent of provisions for depletion. The
same result may be achieved by reducing the corporation's stated
capital.4 8 The doctrine, moreover, has come under recent criti-
cism as being ill-suited to its purposes. 49 Nimble dividends, sim-
ilarly, are paid at a time when there is no accumulated surplus, but
when there is a record of earnings for the year in which they are
paid. As a matter of policy, such dividends are questionable since
they also can be adequately provided for by reduction of stated
capital, unless the prohibition against insolvency would be vio-
lated.
A matter unclear under most dividend provisions is whether
"surplus" is produced by increases in the value of assets without
sale thereof (so-called "unrealized appreciation"). This issue was
favorably resolved in the leading New York decision of Randall
v. Bailey,50 and resolved negatively, based upon some statutory
guidance, in Pennsylvania.51 New York's revisers claimed to have
adopted the Randall v. Bailey rule, but nothing in the language of
the statute specifically supports that conclusion. The proposed
Michigan Act adopts a carefully limited Randall v. Bailey ap-
proach by defining "total assets," which enter into the surplus
calculation, as follows:
Total assets means the total of those properties and rights
entered upon the books of the corporation in accordance with
generally accepted accounting principles, or the current fair
market value of such properties and rights of the corpo-
ration. 52
Though this approach may lend itself to possible abuse, it avoids
the necessity of a sale of appreciated assets in order to make a
corporate distribution. This feature will prove particularly valu-
4N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 510 (McKinney 1963), amended in part, (McKinney Supp.
1970).
47 DEL. CODE ANN. tit 8, § 170 (Supp. 1968).
48 See Proposed Mich. Bus. Corp. Act §418.
' See Carpenter, A Critical Evaluation of the Wasting Asset Distribution, 25 Bus.
LAW. 1733 (1970).
50 288 N.Y. 280, 43 N.E.2d 43 (1942).
11 Berks Broadcasting Co. v. Craumer, 356 Pa. 620, 52 A.2d 571 (1947).
52 Proposed Mich. Bus. Corp. Act § 102(p).
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able where, as in some reorganizations, substantial distributions
must be made without selling appreciated coruorate assets.
The Commission similarly rejected "trust fund" notions in the
initial sale of stock, payment for which may include notes or
future services by the purchasers thereof.53 This provision, unlike
those of all other states,54 is based on the theory that shares
should be salable for the same forms of consideration for which
any other commodities may be sold. Indeed, if the corporation
can trade its assets for notes or future services, it would seem
appropriate that it could do the same with its shares.
55
Other provisions relating to capital structure allow shares
redeemable at the option of the shareholder as well as the corpo-
ration,56 permit extensive variations among series of shares, 57 and
allow reduction of stated capital upon resolution by the board of
directors, without a shareholder vote. 58 The overall result is a
form of financial freedom for corporations unique to American
corporation law.
D. Management and Control
Particularly in close corporations, the standardized manage-
ment and voting structure imposed by most corporation laws
involves unnecessary formality and tends to frustrate desirable
managerial arrangements. There is little basis in policy, for ex-
ample, behind the prohibition against agreements withdrawing
managerial discretion from ("sterilizing") the board of directors
by restrictive agreements, particularly if all shareholders are sig-
natories. Only in very recent years have such agreements been
accepted by the courts. 59 The need for statutory guidance is
obvious, and the proposed statute provides it. Voting agreements
of virtually every description are validated, though agreements
affecting operations of the corporation, as opposed to simply
voting pools, must be signed by all the shareholders. 60 Share
transfer restrictions of every type, including "consent restraints"
are similarly authorized -again with the requirement that the re-
53 Id. § 406.
54 But see Petrishen v. Westmoreland Fin. Co., 394 Pa. 552, 147 A.2d 392 (1959)
(validating future services as consideration, where stock was issued to induce employee to
leave former employment).
5 On this point, the Reporter dissented from the Commission's views.
56 Proposed Mich. Bus. Corp. Act §415.
57 Id. § 402.
58 id. § 418.
59 Compare Long Park, Inc. v. Trenton-New Brunswick Theatres Co., 297 N.Y. 174,
77 N.E.2d 633 (1948), with Galler v. Galler, 32 II.2d 16, 203 N.E.2d 577 (1964).
6 0 Proposed Mich. Bus. Corp. Act § 514.
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straints be consented to by the restrained shareholders (unless, of
course, the shares were purchased subject to the restraint).6'
Coupled with these provisions are sections deleting Michigan's
archaic mardatory cumulative voting, 62 broadly permitting irrevo-
cable proxies, 63 and allowing for dissolution by previous agree-
ment of the shareholders and in the event of deadlock.6 4
A more unusual provision, adopted verbatim from the Dela-
ware Law,6 5 allows any action to be taken by shareholders with-
out a meeting, provided only that a sufficient number of share-
holders to approve the action consent in writing thereto.66 Thus, if
a majority block of shares is owned by a group of shareholders,
they may under this section (unless otherwise provided in the
articles of incorporation), amend the articles, merge, dissolve,
etc., simply by giving the minority shareholders subsequent notice
of the action taken. This section recognizes realistically that a
majority block of shares can effect a corporate action in any
event, and that prior notice and formal vote do not affect the
result.6 7 On this issue, however, the Reporter dissented from the
Commission recommendations. The section as proposed would
allow majority shareholders to merge or change the corporation
with no prior notice to the minority. Moreover, the section would
apply to existing corporations, whose shareholders could not have
contemplated the introduction of this unique rule. The dissent
suggests that affirmative provisions in the articles be required if
such action without a meeting is to be allowed; and that in any
event, major corporate changes not be subject to action without a
meeting. This dissenting approach is in effect in New Jersey. 68
Even if only the New Jersey approach is adopted, Michigan will
become the third state to allow action by shareholders without a
meeting upon less than a unanimous vote of shareholders.69
Just as excessive shareholder formality has trammelled corpo-
61 Id. § 516, derived from DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 202 (Supp. 1968). Many decisions
have upheld transfer restrictions which confer a first option to purchase shares upon the
corporation or a stated group of shareholders. By contrast "consent restraints" simply
prohibit transfer of the shares without the consent of the corporation or of stated in-
dividuals.
62 Proposed Mich. Bus. Corp. Act § 512.
3 Id. § 507.
MId. § 904, 912. Note, too, that section 912 is drafted to avoid the early interpretation
requiring irreparable injury to secure dissolution: Compare In re Radom & Neidorff, Inc.,
307 N.Y. 1, 119 N.E.2d 563 (1954).
r DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 228 (Supp. 1968).
" Proposed Mich. Bus. Corp. Act § 503.
67 Nevertheless section 14 and the proxy rules under the 1934 Securities Exchange Act
would require such a prior notice with respect to any section 12(g) corporation.
68 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14A:5-6 (Supp. 1970).
6 Compare MBCA § 145 and present MICH. COMP. LAWS § 450.39a (Supp. 1970)-
action without meeting only on unanimous consent.
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rate action prior to statutory change, limitations on director ac-
tion, together with fears of director liability, have stood in the way
of free action by the corporate management. The proposed Act
deals with all of these problems. The Act permits classification of
the board of directors, with no lower limit on the size of each
class. In addition, it allows provision in the articles for election of
a director or directors by the shares of any class or series. 70 The
Act allows action by the directors without a meeting by unani-
mous consent,7 1 and permits a director or directors to be present
at a meeting by means of conference telephone facilities.
72 It
makes broad provision for loans to directors and officers when
"such assistance may reasonably be expected to benefit the cor-
poration,"73 thus considerably liberalizing existing law which re-
quires a two-thirds disinterested vote of the board.7 4 The Act
includes a broad provision, similar to those now in effect in New
York, New Jersey and Delaware, validating transactions with
interested directors.7 5 Such a transaction is not void or voidable
solely because of interest, provided any of three criteria is satis-
fied: (1) the transaction was fair and reasonable when authorized;
(2) the board had knowledge of the interest and the transaction
and approved it by a sufficient disinterested vote; or (3) the
shareholders had knowledge of the interest and the transaction
and approved it.76
E. Indemnification of Directors and Officers
Much interest has recently been focussed on the problems of
director liability, particularly in the context of cases like Bar-
Chris.7TA joint committee of draftsmen for the Model Act and the
Delaware Corporation Law prepared an inclusive section on in-
demnification and insurance for directors that has now been writ-
ten into the Model Act and the Delaware law.78 That section,
with several changes, was included in the proposed Act.7 9 The
70 Proposed Mich. Bus. Corp. Act § 603, derived from N.J. STAT. §§ 14A6 - 3, 14A:6 -
1(1969); MBCA § 37.
71 Proposed Mich. Bus. Corp. Act § 607(b).




MICH. COMP. LAWS § 450.46 (1967).
75 Proposed Mich. Bus. Corp. Act § 611. See N.J. STAT. § 14A:6 - 5 (1969); N.Y. Bus.
CORP. LAW § 713 (McKinney Supp. 1970); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 144 (Supp. 1968).
76 Proposed Mich. Bus. Corp. Act § 611.
77 Escott v. BarChris Constr. Corp., 283 F. Supp. 643 (S.D.N.Y. 1968) (holding both
"inside" and "outside" directors liable for false statements on a prospectus pursuant to
§ II of the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77k). (Attorneys, accountants and under-
writers were also held liable by that decision).
78 MBCA § 5; DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 145(h) (2 P-H CORP. 1560 (June 10, 1970)).
"6 Proposed Mich. Bus. Corp. Act § 615.
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proposed section distinguishes indemnification in third-party ac-
tions (allowing indemnification for judgments as well as expenses),
from indemnification in actions by shareholders and the corpo-
ration itself (allowing indemnification for expenses only). In-
demnification is mandatory in either situation where the defendant
is successful "on the merits or otherwise." Where the defendant is
not successful, indemnification is permissive "if he acted in good
faith and in a manner he reasonably believed to be in or not
opposed to the best interests of the corporation or its share-
holders, and with respect to any criminal action or proceeding,
had no reasonable cause to believe his conduct was unlawful."
The italicized words, not present in the Delaware-Model Act
formulation, were added to avoid the possibility that in-
demnification might be permissible in a Texas Gulf Sulphur80
insider-trading situation based on action not opposed to the best
interests of the corporation.81 Permissive indemnification is by
majority vote of a disinterested quorum of the board, by vote of
the shareholders, or by written opinion of independent legal coun-
sel. 82 The statute also allows the corporation to advance expenses
to a defendant who undertakes to repay such expenses in the
event he is not found to be entitled to indemnification.
The Delaware and Model Act formulation further provides that
the corporation may take out insurance for a director, officer or
employee whether or not it could indemnify him under the other
provisions of the section, 83 and that the corporation may by
agreement or otherwise provide any other form of indemnification
(a "non-exclusive" clause).8 4 The first of these provisions was
included in the proposed Michigan section to preclude placing
unnecessary limits on insurance coverage.8 5 The second was re-
jected. Even the Model Act and Delaware draftsmen were unable
to state what forms of indemnification agreement, not contrary to
80 S.E.C. v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 883 (2d Cir. 1968).
81 This possibility is adverted to in Sebring, Recent Legislative Changes in the Law of
Indemnification of Directors, Officers and Others, 23 Bus. LAW. 95 (1967). The draftsman
of the Delaware provision had some doubts concerning the Delaware draftsmanship in this
connection; accordingly, he opposed the inclusion of the words "or not opposed to." See
Note, Law for Sale: A Study of the Delaware Corporation Law of 1967, 117 U. PA. L.
REV. 861, 879 (1969).
82 One commentator, critical of the breadth of the Delaware statute, questions whether
"independent legal counsel" will prove genuinely independent in such a determination. See
Bishop, Sitting Ducks and Decoy Ducks: New Trends in the Indemnification of Corporate
Directors and Officers, 77 YALE L.J. 1078 (1968).
aa MBCA § 5(a); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 145(g) (Supp. 1968).
84 MBCA § 5(f); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 145(f) (Supp. 1968).
1 Proposed Mich. Bus. Corp. Act § 615. In any event, insurance companies may
underwrite only "insurable risks," and are themselves subject to regulation in the public
interest.
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public policy, could be drafted which would not already fit within
the exceptionally broad coverage of the other subsections.8 6 In
place of the non-exclusive clause, the Michigan proposal provides
that any other form of indemnification "shall be invalid only
insofar as it is in conflict with this section." In the opinion of the
Reporter, this language does not in fact alter the substance of the
Model Act-Delaware provision as it would be interpreted by the
court, but rather avoids any misleading implications of the Model
Act- Delaware provision.
F. Mergers, Consolidations and Sales ofAssets
Another area of simplification, in which Michigan's existing law
has provided impetus for out-of-state incorporation, is major cor-
porate changes: mergers, consolidation, dissolution, and sale of
assets. The proposed Act will afford the simplest procedures in
the nation for effectuating such major changes. Throughout the
statute, majority vote has been adopted (except as otherwise
provided in the articles of incorporation),8 7 which, as noted ear-
lier, may be achieved without a shareholder meeting.88 Uniform
procedures for class vote89 and greater-than-majority vote 90 are
tied directly into the appropriate substantive sections by cross-
reference.
In addition, Michigan has looked to the examples set by Dela-
ware and New Jersey in providing for no-vote mergers and in
limiting the dissenters' appraisal remedy. Thus, the now common
short-merger provision (though not currently in effect in Mich-
igan) is included in a very liberal form.91 Uphill and downhill
mergers, as well as multiple-corporation mergers, are permitted
without a vote of any kind if the parent corporation survives and
owns ninety percent of the outstanding shares of each class of
subsidiary being merged. 92 A provision drawn from Delaware
law 93 provides for merger without the vote of the surviving corpo-
8See Sebring, supra note 81, at 105. The Delaware draftsmen opposed the
non-exclusive clause. Law for Sale: A Study of the Delaware Corporation Law of 1967,
supra note 81, at 883.
87The proposed Act requires majority vote for: amendment of articles; merger or
consolidation; sale of corporate assets; dissolution. New Proposed Mich. Corp. Act §§
702, 802, 808,902.
"8Proposed Mich. Bus. Corp. Act § 503.





92 In uphill merger the subsidiary is merged into the parent and the parent survives; in
downhill merger the parent is merged into the subsidiary and the subsidiary survives. A
vote is required if so provided in the articles, or if a subsidiary is to be the surviving
corporation, or if the articles of the parent are to be amended in a manner that would
otherwise require a shareholder vote. Proposed Mich. Bus. Corp. Act § 804(f).
93 DEL. CoRP. LAW § 25 1(f) (2 P-H CoRP. 2726 (June 10, 1970) ).
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ration's shareholders where the plan of merger does not amend its
articles or change or redeem any shares of stock outstanding
immediately prior to the merger, and where the shares of common
stock to be issued or delivered under the merger plan do not
exceed twenty percent of the shares of common stock outstanding
immediately prior to the merger? 4 Moreover, in such a situation,
the shareholders of the surviving corporation have no appraisal
remedy. 95
The impact of these provisions will be that a growing corpo-
ration with adequate authorized shares can expand by merger,
without a vote of its shareholders, either by "creeping acquisi-
tion" of another corporation until the ninety percent threshold is
reached (in which event no vote of the subsidiary is required
either); or by direct merger if the expanding corporation issues no
more than twenty percent common stock in the transaction (in
which event a vote of the disappearing corporation's shareholders
will ordinarily be required).
In fact, the substance of these transactions could, before these
provisions were drafted, have been carried out without a vote of
the acquiring corporation by means of the "C Reorganization, '" 9 6
which consists of a sale of assets by the disappearing corporation
to the surviving corporation (in return for shares of the surviving
corporation), followed by dissolution of the disappearing corpo-
ration and distribution to its shareholders of the shares received in
the sale. The wide use of this approach to achieve the substantive
result of a statutory merger led to some judicial attempts to
characterize the transaction as a "de facto" merger, requiring the
formalities of a true statutory merger.97 This approach was
resoundingly rejected in Delaware9" on the basis that the al-
ternatives clearly permitted by the statute should not be precluded
by judicial reconstruction of the transaction. Though the status of
the "de facto" merger doctrine is unclear where it has not been
litigated, as in Michigan, the proposed section 808 does not adopt
the doctrine, and the notes thereto reject any such interpretation
of the section. Section 802(c) will, in addition, allow the use of the
statutory merger in some situations with no further formality than
otherwise would have been required by the sale-of-assets merger.
94 Proposed Mich. Bus. Corp. Act § 802(c).
95 Id. § 809(d).
96 INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 368(a) (1) (C).
97 See, e.g., Farris v. Glen Alden Corp., 393 Pa. 427, 143 A.2d 25 (1958) (putative
purchasing corporation was in fact the selling corporation); Rath v. Rath Packing Co., 257
Ia. 1277, 136 N.w.2d 410 (1965) (de facto merger).
9 8 See, e.g., Heilbrunn v. Sun Chem. Corp., 38 Del. Ch. 321, 150 A.2d 755 (Sup. Ct.
1959). For an exhaustive coverage of the Delaware approach, see Folk, De Facto
Mergers in Delaware: Hariton v. Arco Electronics Inc., 49 VA. L. REV. 1261 (1963).
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In at least some circumstances the statutory merger may be
desirable for other purposes, and this new provision allows its use
without the greater formality previously required.
For some time, commentators have been critical of the ap-
praisal remedy provided by most statutes for shareholders who
dissent from mergers and consolidations and from sales of all or
substantially all the corporate assets. 99 The remedy has been
attacked primarily on the ground that it can be used by a small
minority to effectively block a merger. If, for example, fifteen
percent of the shares demand cash, the cash drain-together with
the potential litigation on the question of value-may render the
entire transaction too expensive. Moreover, the complexity of the
remedy seriously limits its value to the complaining shareholder,
whose time and expense in the necessarily complex appraisal
proceedings may cost more than the value of the shares them-
selves.100
In at least one setting-where the shares affected have a ready
market which is not unusually or adversely affected by the an-
nouncement of the proposed merger-the elimination of the ap-
praisal remedy seems clearly appropriate. The complaining share-
holder in that situation may sell his shares more simply than he
may obtain appraisal; and it seems perfectly fair to require that he
do so, rather than burden the corporation with a complex and
expensive procedure. 10 1 This approach was ultimately included in
the revised Delaware law.
10 2
The proposed Michigan statute, though providing appraisal in
two situations not historically allowed in Delaware,103 constitutes
the most sweeping limitation of appraisal yet proposed. 0 4 In
summary, appraisal is excluded-except as otherwise provided in
the articles of incorporation: whenever the shares affected "are
listed on a national securities exchange or are held of record by
not less than 2,000 persons;" whenever the consideration for the
99Delaware has never provided the appraisal remedy in the sale-of-assets situation.
100 For a brief against the appraisal remedy, see Manning, The Shareholder's Appraisal
Remedy: An Essay for Frank Coker, 72 YALE L.J. 223 (1962); see also Vorenberg,
Exclusiveness of the Dissenting Stockholder's Appraisal Right, 77 HARV. L. REV. 1189
(1964).
101 The appraisal decisions, interestingly enough,-particularly in Delaware-have rarely
accepted even a genuine market price as the inherent value of the shares. See, e.g.,
Application of Delaware Racing Ass'n, 213 A.2d 203 (Del. Sup. Ct. 1965); Perlman v.
Feldmann, 154 F. Supp. 436 (D. Conn. 1957).
102 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 262 (Supp. 1968).
103 Sale of assets and certain amendments; see infra note 113 and accompanying text
discussing section 704.
104 Proposed Mich. Bus. Corp. Act § 809.
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merger or sale of assets (followed by dissolution of the selling
corporation) consists of any combination of cash, bonds or shares,
provided any such shares are listed on a national securities ex-
change or are held of record by not less than two thousand
persons; and when the dissenter owns shares in the surviving
corporation to a section 802(c) merger.'
0 5
The Reporter dissented to this section, noting that it goes well
beyond the Delaware law'6 which requires marketability of the
shares surrendered and the shares received. If no market exists
for disposition of the shares when the merger plan is announced,
the dissenting shareholder has no remedy until after the merger is
consummated. In this respect, the proposed Michigan statute
provides substantially less protection than Delaware's. Moreover,
the original conception of the Delaware provision is based on the
theory that a market provides adequate protection. Yet, it remains
true that announcement of a merger plan may have a substantial
adverse effect on the market. A market at a sacrifice price is
hardly an adequate safeguard; indeed, all the appraisal statutes
recognize this point by setting the valuation independently of any
effect caused by the announcement of the plan. 107 Under the
proposed statute, the objecting shareholder in the cited situation
would have only the alternative of attempting to enjoin the trans-
action. It was precisely this result that the original appraisal
statutes were intended to avoid, and the reduction of appraisal
may unfortunately result in the widespread issuance of injunctions
against proposed mergers.
The solution to this dilemma is not readily apparent, although
one possibility considered and rejected by the Law Revision
Commission was to eliminate appraisal only where the stock price
does not drop below a stated percentage (e.g., seventy-five percent
of its price in the interval between the announcement of the plan
and the record date for voting). 10 8 This approach would deter
injunction attempts and would also provide some genuine basis
for assuring the dissenting shareholder that he could withdraw
from the proposed venture without substantial adverse effect.
IV. SOME UNIQUE PROVISIONS
In several respects the proposed Michigan corporation statute
clearly stands in the forefront of "liberalized" state corporation
105 See notes 93-99 supra.
106 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 262(k) (Supp. 1968).
1
0 7 E.g., MBCA § 81, I.
10 8See Reporter's Dissent to section 809.
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laws, and at the same time provides for "protective" measures not
now found in the major statutes.
The proposed Act is the first to permit elimination of share
certificates. 10 9 The physical handling of share certificates entails
substantial expense and risk of loss, and it now appears clear that
alternatives to share certificates will necessarily be introduced
within the coming decade.110 Although it would be possible to
detail an alternate procedure to replace stock certificates, com-
mentators and the exchanges are still unclear what the best proce-
dure would be. Indeed, the procedures will most likely be deter-
mined by the exchanges and the proposed statute makes provision
in that form:
Unless otherwise provided in the articles of incorporation,
if the shares or other securities of a corporation are listed on
a national securities exchange, the corporation may by resolu-
tion of the board eliminate certificates representing such
shares or securities and provide for such other methods of
recording and noticing ownership as may be provided by the
rules of such national securities exchange."1 '
The proposed Act includes a section, derived from New York
law,11 2 that provides an appraisal remedy upon amendment of the
articles if the amendment materially alters or abolishes any prefer-
ential right of a share having preferences, or creates, alters or
abolishes any material provisions on redemption or a sinking fund
for redemption of such shares.113 Since appraisal proceedings are
limited to situations of non-marketability of shares, this section
provides protection against dilution of preference rights in those
situations where the affected shareholder has no relief in the
marketplace.
A new provision, derived in part from the Model Act1 14 and in
part from the South Carolina law' 1 5 provides protection against
oppressive acts of majority shareholders.' 16 The section gives the
usual discretion to the circuit court to dissolve the corporation
upon the action of a shareholder "when it is established that *the
I"' Proposed Mich. Bus. Corp. Act § 410(e).
110 For recent comments, see "For Eliminating the Stock Certificate," a guest column
by Eli Weinberg (of the New York CPA firm of Lybrand, Ross Bros. & Montgomery) in
the Wall Street Journal, Sept. 24, 1970, at 12, col. 4. For more comprehensive coverage,
see Jolls, Can We Do Without Stock Certificates, 23 Bus. LAW. 909 (1968); Kendall, The
Certificates Society:A Realistic Appraisal, 24 Bus. LAW. 141 (1968).
111 See note 109 supra.
112 N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 806(b) (6) (McKinney Supp. 1970).
113 Proposed Mich. Bus. Corp. Act § 704.
114 MBCA § 97(a).
115 S.C. CODE ANN. & 12- 22.15(a) (4), 12- 22.23 (Supp. 1970).
118 Proposed Mich. Bus. Corp. Act § 913.
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acts of the directors or those in control of the corporation are
illegal, fraudulent, or willfully unfair and oppressive to the corpo-
ration or to such shareholder. " 11 7 In addition, however, the sec-
tion provides that upon establishment of the grounds for relief, the
court may grant alternative relief, to include without limitation:
cancelling or altering any provision in the articles or by-laws;
cancelling, altering or enjoining any resolution or other act of the
corporation; directing or prohibiting any act of the corporation, its
shareholders, directors or officers; and providing for purchase of
the shares of any shareholder by the corporation or by those
responsible for the wrongful acts. Some favorable experience has
developed with this approach in England and the Commonwealth
countries.11 It has the virtue of being far less restrictive than the
draconian remedy of dissolution alone. Moreover, since the al-
ternative remedies are permissive, they allow some discretion in
the court: thus it would be unlikely that the remedies would be
applied to a publicly marketed corporation, where sale of the
shares would provide adequate remedy for the complaining share-
holder.
Finally, the new Act carries forward Michigan's admi-
rable-but not universally followed-practice of mandatory an-
nual report to the shareholders." 9 This is consistent with the
approach that full information to shareholders is frequently more
effective protection than restrictive substantive provisions.
117 See, e.g., Gidwitz v. Lanzit Corrugated Box Co., 20 Ill.2d 208, 170 N.E.2d 131, 138
(1960) ("The cumulative effects of these many acts and incidents ... combine to constitute
that oppression which entitles plaintiffs to the only remedy provided by law-dissolution").
"18 The statute is similar to section 210 of the English Companies Act of 1948 and
section 186 of the Uniform Australian Companies Act of 1961. For commentary, see
Afterman, Statutory Protection for Oppressed Minority Shareholders: A Model for Re-
form, 55 VA. L. REV. 1043 (1969).
i19 Proposed Mich. Bus. Corp. Act. § 1001(a), derived from MICH. COMP. LAWS
§ 450.45 2 (1967).
